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AfricAn SyStemS
AfricAn Union conSiderS  
ProPoSAlS to Add internAtionAl 
criminAl JUriSdiction to the  
PAn-AfricAn coUrt
The African Union (AU) is considering 
whether to add jurisdiction to hear inter-
national criminal law cases in the future 
African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, a merger of the current human 
rights court and the court of justice. 
Drafters submitted a proposal to the AU 
in July 2012 to amend the 2008 Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (2008 Protocol) 
to include an international criminal law 
section along with both the pending general 
affairs and existing human rights sections. 
The 2008 Protocol still needs twelve more 
ratifications before the AU will merge the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Human Rights Court) with the 
African Court of Justice—the latter being 
a court established in the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union—under one body: 
the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights. Under the proposed third section, 
the new combined Court would also have 
jurisdiction to hear criminal cases against 
individuals. However, the AU has delayed 
making a decision on the matter but plans 
to do so sometime this year. Although 
some have supported the proposal, other 
stakeholders have urged the AU to recon-
sider the proposed merger due to potential 
human rights ramifications.
Skeptics of the proposal have expressed 
fear that the expanded jurisdiction into 
international crimes would undermine the 
human rights progress made in the region. 
Frans Viljoen of the Centre for Human 
Rights at the University of Pretoria has 
argued that the disparate mandates between 
the proposed general affairs and human 
rights sections, both of which would hold 
states responsible, and the international 
criminal section, which would hold 
individuals responsible, would create a 
lack of uniformity in their operations. 
The three sections would require varied 
legal standards, intensities of fact-finding, 
and amounts of resources. These planned 
differences thus leave open the possibility 
that less expertise will be devoted to 
human rights and its importance will be 
diminished within the new system. For 
example, the proposed protocol only calls 
for five human rights judges, as opposed 
to the current eleven that sit on the Human 
Rights Court, and it proposes that a general 
court of appeals—with judges that do not 
necessarily possess particularized human 
rights experience—hear cases from the 
human rights section.
The debate, however, also centers on 
the political tensions between the AU 
and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in The Hague. The ICC, which has 
jurisprudence that has come almost exclu-
sively from situations in African countries, 
and the AU have often disagreed on how 
to handle cases. However, the AU has 
typically only resisted moves by the ICC 
to hold current leaders of African states 
accountable before the court, presumably 
due to the perceived negative impacts of 
ICC indictments against African heads of 
state in ongoing negotiations and peace 
processes for the AU. The AU Heads of 
State and Government decided in 2009 
not to comply with the arrest warrant 
for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 
order to promote peace in Sudan. In doing 
so, the AU encouraged further investi-
gation into the addition of international 
criminal jurisdiction to the pan-African 
judicial system in light of the negative 
impact the indictment by an international 
court had on establishing peace in Sudan. 
More recently, the AU in 2011 took issue 
with the ICC’s charges against Moammar 
Qaddafi, the former Libyan leader, 
and stated at the 17th AU Summit that 
the arrest warrant for Qaddafi hindered 
progress toward negotiating a resolution 
in Libya.
In light of the already existing tensions 
between the AU and the ICC, it is unclear 
how the ICC will handle its overlap with 
the proposed court’s jurisdiction. The 
complementarity principle under the Rome 
Statute encourages domestic prosecution 
and only allows the ICC to investigate 
when the domestic judicial system fails 
to do so adequately, but the ICC has 
yet to extend this principle to regional 
criminal courts. Some proponents of the 
proposal, such as Chidi Anselm Odinkalu 
of the Open Society Justice Initiative, have 
endorsed the new court as a way to expand 
the complementarity principle to allow the 
AU a chance to respond to situations in 
African states and improve accountability 
in the pan-African system.
If the AU adopts a criminal jurisdiction 
addition to the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, the pan-African human 
rights system would be the first regional 
human rights system to adopt a court with 
an international criminal mandate, bringing 
with it new challenges. A major concern of 
adopting international criminal jurisdic-
tion is the amount of resources required to 
protect witnesses, engage in extensive fact-
finding, and maintain the three chambers: 
the pre-trial chamber, the trial chamber, 
and the appellate chamber. For a regional 
human rights system, stretching resources 
to meet these economic needs will be a 
challenge. Issues of jurisdictional overlap 
with the ICC and maintaining the strength 
of the current human rights mandate present 
additional challenges. How the AU deals 
with the difficulties that will come with a 
new international regional criminal court 
could negatively impact human rights in 
the region but could also set a precedent 
for other regional human rights systems to 
take on international criminal mandates.
ecoWAS coUrt AgreeS to heAr 
cASe BroUght By inmAteS on deAth 
roW AgAinSt the gAmBiA
The Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) Community 
Court of Justice (ECCJ) agreed to hear 
a case against the Gambia involving its 
decision to impose death sentences. The 
Socio-Economic Rights and Account-
ability Project (SERAP), a Nigerian-based 
NGO, filed a complaint with the ECCJ in 
September 2012 on behalf of two Nigerian 
prison inmates, Michael Ifunanya and 
Stanley Agbaeze, who are currently on 
death row in The Gambia. The plaintiffs 
allege violations of their rights to life, 
due process of law, justice and judicial 
independence, a fair hearing, appeal, and 
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effective remedy. The ECCJ is set to hear 
the case in May 2013.
The case arises out of a controversial 
order issued in August 2012 by Gambian 
President Yahya Jammeh to execute all 
42 inmates on death row within a month 
to deter violent crime in the country. 
President Jammeh executed nine of the 
inmates before mounting international 
pressure caused him to desist. Amnesty 
International had previously labeled The 
Gambia as abolitionist in practice, catego-
rizing it as one of 141 states that no longer 
implement the death penalty. The nine 
executions end a 27-year period without 
capital punishment and implicate the rights 
of inmates. At least one of the executed 
inmates, Lamin Darboe, had an appeal 
pending at the time of his execution.
The plaintiffs want the ECCJ to order 
The Gambia to enforce rights expressed in 
several instruments. The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter) includes the right to appeal under 
Article 7, which the plaintiffs were denied 
after sentencing. Additionally, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights adopted a resolution in 2008 calling 
for a moratorium on the death penalty. The 
UN General Assembly has also backed a 
moratorium on the death penalty with the 
goal of abolishing the practice. Finally, the 
plaintiffs ask The Gambia to comply with 
its own Constitution: Provision 18 of The 
Gambian Constitution allows for the death 
penalty but directs the National Assembly 
to reconsider the possibility of abolishing 
the death penalty within ten years of 
the Constitution coming into force. The 
National Assembly failed to conduct the 
review in 2007.
Even if the ECCJ does order the Gambia 
to implement the instruments and awards 
damages to the plaintiffs, The Gambia may 
choose not to comply with the decision. 
Although ECCJ decisions are legally bind-
ing on Member States, The Gambia has 
a history of noncompliance. The Gambia 
has yet to comply with two ECCJ deci-
sions issued in 2008 and 2010 for the 
detention and torture of two journalists. 
The ECCJ requires Member States to set 
up national implementation mechanisms 
under Article 24 of the Supplementary 
Protocol to enforce ECCJ decisions, but 
The Gambia has yet to create the necessary 
system. ECOWAS announced a new focus 
on effective implementation in September 
2012, but how it will ensure future compli-
ance with ECCJ decisions from noncom-
pliant Member States remains to be seen. 
Justice Ana Nana Daboya of the ECCJ has 
publicly stated that noncompliance with 
ECCJ decisions is a violation of Member 
States’ obligations and should be cause for 
financial sanctions.
If the ECCJ rules in favor of the plain-
tiffs and ECOWAS takes action to enforce 
the judgment, the ECCJ’s ruling could 
not just ensure the rights of the rest of the 
inmates on death row but in the process 
could also help shape more broadly the 
effectiveness of ECCJ rulings in the future. 
There are still 38 inmates left on death row 
and a favorable outcome for the two plain-
tiffs in May could help ensure the right to 
life and to a fair trial, pursuant to Articles 
4 and 7 of the African Charter for all 
the inmates. Additionally, ECOWAS could 
use a ruling against The Gambia to set a 
precedent of enforcement of ECCJ deci-
sions against traditionally noncompliant 
Member States. ECOWAS has not speci-
fied how it would enforce ECCJ decisions 
itself if it should choose to do so, but 
it could take the suggestion of Justice 
Ana Nana Daboya and impose financial 
sanctions on noncompliant states. Thus 
the ECCJ’s decision in May will be an 
important one because it could poten-
tially shape the status of the death penalty 
in Member States and make a significant 
step toward ensuring future compliance 
with its decisions.
Brittany West, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
EuropEan SyStEm
EuropEan Court of Human rigHtS 
rulES on ExprESSing rEligiouS 
BEliEfS at Work
In a landmark judgment on religious 
freedom, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR, Court) ruled that there 
is a right to manifest individual faith by 
wearing religious adornments and that 
the religious beliefs of state employees 
cannot justify an exception to anti- 
discrimination laws. The Court in Eweida 
and Others v. the United Kingdom joined 
four claims containing similar issues of 
religious freedom in the workplace. In 
all four cases, the applicants claimed that 
their rights to non-discrimination and free 
“thought, conscience or religion” had been 
violated by judgments in U.K. domestic 
courts. Articles 9 and 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
guarantee the right to right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion and 
prohibit discrimination. Two of the cases 
also included issues regarding the balance 
between the freedom to display religious 
symbols and an employer’s stated dress 
codes. The remaining two cases regarded 
an employee’s right to abstain from serv-
ing homosexual clients because of the 
employee’s personal religious beliefs.
On the issue of religious symbols, 
the two petitioners argued the employers 
placed undue restrictions on their religious 
freedom by prohibiting visible cross neck-
laces which represented their Christian 
faith. In balancing a British Airways 
employee’s wish to manifest her religious 
belief with her employer’s desire to project 
a certain corporate image, the Court found 
that the employer acted unfairly. Although 
the company’s desire was legitimate, the 
ECtHR found that the national courts had 
given too much weight to the employer’s 
interests in light of factors including the 
company permitting other religious sym-
bols (such as turbans and hijabs), the 
discreet nature of the cross, and the lack 
of evidence that the employer’s reputation 
would be impacted. However, the second 
case shows that this right is not abso-
lute. The Court deferred to the employer 
hospital’s assessment because they were 
better situated to make the decision given 
the safety and infection risks posed by a 
necklace in the healthcare setting. Thus, 
the nature of the workplace is relevant to 
enforcing dress codes that limit the display 
of religious symbols.
In the second issue, the Court found 
that the right to express religious beliefs 
is limited by a state’s obligation to not 
promulgate discriminatory practices. The 
petitioners, a public registrar and a pub-
lically employed relationship counselor, 
challenged their dismissals for refusing to 
serve gay and lesbian clients by arguing 
that it was disproportionate and discrimina-
tory for employers to require employees to 
provide services to same-sex couples when 
doing so obligated them to violate their 
religious beliefs, which compelled them to 
refuse to condone same-sex couples. The 
Court disagreed and found in both cases 
that the employers’ policies were aimed at 
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providing services on a non-discriminatory 
basis to ensure the rights of all. The 
Court stressed that freedom of religion 
encompasses the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion, including in the workplace, but 
that a person’s religious practice can be 
restricted where it encroaches on the rights 
of others.
U.K. and European law both recognize 
religious freedom as a human right but 
not as an absolute right that applies irre-
spective of its effect on others. Thus, the 
Eweida judgment highlights this conflict 
where the Court must balance between 
respecting individual rights to freedom of 
expressing one’s religion with collective 
rights to be free from discrimination.
In decisions such as in Dahlab v. 
Switzerland (2001), the Court has ruled 
that a person’s right to religious freedom 
is mitigated by work place duties, such as 
in declining to protect a teacher’s right to 
wear a head scarf in class, as in Dahlab. 
Furthermore, the Court has held in cases 
such as Stedman v. United Kingdom (1997) 
that because an employee has the freedom 
to choose their employment, their right 
to religious freedom is not automatically 
obstructed by workplace requirements 
that touch on religion, such as in signing 
a contract for a job that requires work 
on Sunday, as in Stedman. In the Eweida 
judgment, the Court made a stronger 
statement for personal religious freedom 
and held that it is relevant to the principle 
of equality, and an employer’s policies that 
impinges upon religious freedom must 
be justified. Here, the Court weighed the 
employer’s interests and the employee’s 
ability to resign against the appropriateness 
of the restriction upon religious freedom. The 
Court affirmed the states’ wide discretion 
in reconciling these countervailing rights, 
and in many cases, this wide discretion 
provided by the Court will give states 
the ultimate decision for balancing these 
divergent rights.
Roma ChildRen’s WRongful 
PlaCement in sPeCial sChools is 
disCRiminatoRy
Hungary’s segregation of its education 
system based on students’ mental dis-
abilities violates the right to education 
and freedom from discrimination, accord-
ing to the European Court for Human 
Rights (ECtHR, Court) Chamber ruling 
in Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary. The case 
concerned two young Roma men who 
authorities placed in a school for the men-
tally disabled. The ECtHR found against 
the state and more broadly articulated 
that European governments must institute 
constructive measures to end segregation 
and discrimination against Roma children 
in schools.
The two young Roma men were 
diagnosed as children with mild men-
tal disabilities and the state placed them 
in a remedial school. These institutions 
have a limited and more basic curricu-
lum, offering what the Court found to be 
lower-quality education than mainstream 
counterparts. Because of this inequality, 
the Court found that the students’ educa-
tion did not give them access to the type 
of career they wanted and created de facto 
segregation from the wider population. 
The applicants also alleged that the tests 
used to identify children for placement in 
these schools were outdated and culturally 
biased in their application. To this end, 
the petitioners argued that the tests were 
designed by the state to segregate Roma 
children from the rest of the population. 
Because of this, the petitioners argued that 
education of Roma children in these reme-
dial schools constituted ethnic discrimina-
tion by relegating them to a lesser form of 
schooling. Although the government did not 
dispute the racial bias in at least some of 
the tests used, it argued that an alternative 
examination would compensate for cultural 
bias. The government also claimed that the 
over representation of Roma children in 
the special schools resulted from deficien-
cies tied to their own cultural upbringing, 
which the government contended is a fac-
tor outside the scope of the right to educa-
tion. However, the Court flatly rejected this 
argument.
Ruling in favor of the applicants, the 
Court found a foundational violation of 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to educa-
tion) that and a complimentary violation of 
Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) 
of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR, Convention). The Court 
recognized that Hungary has a long his-
tory of placing Roma children in special 
schools, and that the authorities failed to 
take into account both Roma children’s, and 
the petitioners’ specific needs as members 
of a disadvantaged and historically mar-
ginalized group. Furthermore, the Court 
agreed that Roma children have continu-
ally been overrepresented in the remedial 
schools. The Court has clearly stated that 
states cannot implement policies that are 
prejudicial to one ethnic group, and despite 
the government’s assertions, the ECtHR 
found that there was at least a “danger” that 
the education tests were culturally biased 
and lacked sufficient “special safeguards” 
to protect against misdiagnosis. The Court 
concluded that there are “positive obliga-
tions” on a state to address and remedy 
practices that lead to discriminatory results, 
particularly when that discrimination 
is rooted in a historical discrimination 
against the group. Furthermore, the Court 
found that Hungary had failed to “pro-
vide the necessary safeguards against 
misdiagnosis.”
The Horváth and Kiss judgment estab-
lishes that public education systems must 
enact “particularly stringent” positive mea-
sures to protect pupils that have suffered 
past discrimination that has continuing 
effects, and the state must address struc-
tural disadvantages within school systems. 
According to the Court, it is the state’s 
burden to demonstrate that the placement 
tests used, as well as their application in 
practice, are capable of “fairly and objec-
tively” determining the mental capacity 
of the applicants without undue influence 
by cultural bias. In a procedural issue, the 
decision reinforced that reliable statistical 
evidence may establish prima facie 
discrimination and shift the burden of 
proof to the state. Finally, this judgment 
reaffirmed that in the public education 
setting, it is not necessary to prove dis-
criminatory intent to find discrimination.
This judgment is another in a series of 
cases highlighting the broad violation of 
the human rights of Roma children across 
Europe. The Court found in the present 
case that the education of Roma children 
under an inferior curriculum has limited 
their future educational opportunities by 
coercing them to pursue their studies in 
“special vocational secondary schools.” 
This limits their ability to obtain higher 
education, and as a consequence, the edu-
cation received did not satisfy the positive 
obligations of the State to undo a history 
of racial segregation in education. By 
stating that “the State has specific posi-
tive obligations to avoid the perpetuation 
of past discrimination or discriminative 
practices disguised in allegedly neutral 
tests,” this judgment is part of a broader 
recognition of the often problematic and 
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discriminatory situation of Roma children 
in Hungary and other parts of Europe.
Antonia Latsch, a 2013 L.L.M. recipient 
from the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Inter-AmerIcAn SyStem
country VISItS contInue to SerVe 
AS VItAl tool for HumAn rIgHtS 
ProtectIon In tHe AmerIcAS
In its latest country report, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR, Commission) reflected on its 
2008 country visit to Jamaica and raised 
grave concerns regarding the high levels 
of continued violence inside the country. 
The report suggests the importance of 
country visits in order to collect evidence, 
conduct interviews, and learn more about 
the human rights situation in the Member 
State being visited.
Under Article 106 of the Organization 
of American States (OAS) Charter, the 
Commission’s mandate is to “promote 
the observance and protection of 
human rights.” To meet its mandate 
the Commission undertakes a variety of 
activities, including investigating petitions, 
publishing human rights reports, conduct-
ing in-country visits, and presenting cases 
to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR, Court). Since 1961, the 
IACHR has organized country visits in 
order to conduct in-depth observations. 
Member States must grant permission for 
these visits. In order for a visit to count as 
an in loco visit, in 2001 it was settled that at 
least two Commissioners must participate 
in the visit; an in loco visit also requires 
Commissioners visit in their capacity as 
Commissioner, and not in their Rapporteur 
capacity. In comparison, country visits 
may include less than the two required 
Commissioners and the visits often relate 
to the thematic rapporteurships. Since its 
inception, the Commission has conducted 
92 in loco visits.
The Commission’s Strategic Plan stated 
that it hoped to conduct two in loco 
visits per year, for a total of ten such 
visits between 2011 and 2015. Thus far, it 
appears that there has been one in loco visit 
since the Strategic Plan was announced in 
2011, but there has been a greater number 
of country visits, including three visits 
in 2011, two in 2012, and already one 
in 2013. In loco visits generally lead to 
a published report on the situation on 
human rights observed, a document that is 
distributed to the Permanent Council and 
General Assembly of the OAS.
Jamaica, Suriname, and Colombia all 
serve as recent case studies and highlight 
the value of country visits as an avenue 
for promoting and protecting human 
rights. Since at least 2008 the Commission 
has closely monitored the human rights 
situation in Jamaica. That year, the IACHR 
conducted an in loco visit to Jamaica 
in which Commissioners met with gov-
ernment officials and civil society to 
conduct independent investigations into 
alleged human rights violations, including 
assertions of arbitrary detentions, high 
crime rates, and failures to investigate by 
the police. The Commission has contin-
ued to monitor human rights in Jamaica 
by holding public hearings and most 
recently publishing a report. The report 
summarizes the Commission’s four-year 
observations, and though it welcomes 
Jamaica’s reports that homicides have 
decreased, the Commission stated that 
it remains extremely concerned at the 
high level of insecurity. Furthermore, the 
Commission expressed concern that the 
violence primarily affects the urban poor. 
For its part, Jamaica conceded that it 
continues to battle high levels of violence, 
but stated that it is doing what it can given 
financial constraints.
The Commission is also observing 
human rights in Suriname, where it con-
ducted its most recent in loco visit. The 
visit’s goal was to examine the rights 
of women and indigenous peoples in 
Suriname. Regarding indigenous rights, 
Commissioner Dinah Shelton, Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, rein-
forced the need for Suriname to fully comply 
with the Moiwana and Saramaka judgments 
of the IACtHR and underscored the need 
for the national government to consult with 
local communities on mining projects. 
On the rights of women, Commissioner 
Tracy Robinson, Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Women, applauded the Suriname gov-
ernment for its recent legislative efforts 
to protect women and promote equality. 
She simultaneously stressed the need to 
put financial and human resources behind 
these policies to ensure follow-through 
and increase inclusion of women across 
private and public sectors as well as in 
political decision-making. The visit also 
raised concerns regarding discrimination 
against LGBTI communities in Suriname, 
and Commissioner Robinson called on 
authorities to create a government policy 
that advances gender equality and protects 
against discrimination.
Lastly, during a visit to Colombia, 
the Commission stated that it appreciated 
the government’s efforts to protect human 
rights after five decades of violence. 
However, the Commission also heard from 
members of civil society who stressed 
“the execution of protection measures in 
the interior of the country and in rural areas 
represents greater challenges when com-
pared to the measures implemented in urban 
areas.” Thus, through a country visit the 
Commission learned about the government’s 
progress, and confirmed implementation 
through dialogue with civil society.
Today, scholars believe that visits in 
loco are a way for Member States to 
show cooperation with the Inter-American 
System, and for the Commission to collect 
evidence before a case and improve the 
quality of its decisions. “The Commission 
visits and the follow-up reports create pow-
erful incentives for states to consider the 
international implications of their human 
rights policies. In loco visits and country 
reports, therefore, significantly contrib-
ute to the Commission’s work in dealing 
with gross and mass violations of rights,” 
wrote Claudio Grossman, current Chair 
of the United Nations Committee Against 
Torture and IACHR Commissioner from 
1994-2001.
Inter-AmerIcAn court DetermIneS 
tHAt DomInIcAn rePublIc uSeD 
exceSSIVe force AgAInSt HAItIAn 
mIgrAntS
Following more than two decades of 
tensions between Haitian descendants and 
the Dominican Republic, at least one group 
of Haitians now has a judgment against the 
Dominican Republic. The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR, Court), 
in its decision in the Case of Nadege 
Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, 
said that seven people died and several 
more were seriously injured at the hands 
of the Dominican Republic’s military 
officers when they forcefully expelled 
Haitian migrants from the country.
The IACtHR decision, announced in 
November 2012, cited violations of the 
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American Convention on Human Rights 
(American Convention). The Court noted 
that the Dominican Republic originally 
tried the case by a military tribunal, which 
acquitted the officers. The Court found 
violations of the right to life (Article 
4) regarding the seven people who died 
as a result of excessive force, as well as a 
violation of the right to personal integrity 
(Article 5) concerning those who sur-
vived but were injured by military police. 
In particular, the Court focused on the 
procedures for detention and the expulsion 
of Haitian migrants from the Dominican 
Republic. The Court found that some of 
the victims were illegally and arbitrarily 
detained, which violated the right to per-
sonal liberty (Article 7). Furthermore, 
the expelled victims received none of the 
internationally or domestically recognized 
protections inherent in removal proceed-
ings, a violation of judicial protection 
(Article 25). The collective expulsion of 
migrants likewise violated the right to 
freedom of movement and of residence 
(Article 22). Lastly the Court found that 
there was de facto discrimination against 
the victims because of their migrant status, 
and that the blanket discrimination is a vio-
lation of the obligation to respect the rights 
guaranteed by the American Convention 
(Article 1).
The latest decision involving the 
Dominican Republic follows a string of 
constant and regular provisional measures 
granted by the Court that were focused 
on protecting Haitian migrants inside the 
Dominican Republic. The Inter-American 
Human Rights System has long raised con-
cerns about treatment of Haitians inside 
the Dominican Republic, a sentiment 
noted by the report following the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights’ 
(IACHR, Commission) visit to the island 
nation in 1991. Likewise, in 1999, the 
Commission published a country report 
that expressed apprehension about Haitian 
migrant workers and their families. Also in 
1999, the IACHR received a petition alleg-
ing that mass expulsions of Haitians were 
taking place in the Dominican Republic. 
According to the petition, people were 
expelled at high rates with no opportunity 
to inspect the victims’ documents or famil-
ial ties to the Dominican Republic, and the 
victims believed they were being selected 
by the color of their skin. Thereafter, 
representatives of Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic entered into agreement that the 
Dominican Republic would alert Haiti 
when its nationals were deported.
At a public hearing on the Com-
mission’s request for provisional measures 
for Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian 
descent in the Dominican Republic 
before the IACtHR in August 2000, the 
Commission argued that although immigra-
tion law is within the sovereign authority 
of each country, each state must conduct 
its immigration policy with restraint, and 
if subjecting someone to deportation, the 
state must do so within the constraints of 
the law. For its part, at the same public 
hearing in 2000, the Dominican Republic 
contested that its immigration practices 
respected due process and that it needed 
to repatriate those Haitians illegally pres-
ent in the country. Acting on the briefs, 
reports, and testimony from this public 
hearing, the Court ordered a provisional 
measure to protect certain named individu-
als from being deported, and permitted 
other deported individuals to return to the 
Dominican Republic. The Court also asked 
the Commission and the State to report 
with frequent updates on the situation.
In 2006, the Court expressed concern 
regarding a judgment by the Supreme Court 
of Justice of the Dominican Republic, 
which found the “Commission for the 
Implementation of Provisional Measures” 
unconstitutional and invalidated the 
procedures established to implement 
IACtHR provisional measures. Thus, the 
IACtHR expressed anxiety that no other 
mechanism was in place to implement 
provisional measures. In 2010, following 
the earthquake in Haiti, some sources cited 
as much as a fifteen percent increase in 
the Haitian population in the Dominican 
Republic, making the treatment of migrants 
a continuing issue.
By 2012, the IACtHR acknowledged 
improvements by the Dominican Republic 
and praised its appointment of state author-
ities entrusted with the implementation of 
provisional measures. However, the Court 
raised concern that Dominican authorities 
did not respond to requests from the Court.
In Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican 
Republic, the IACtHR ordered that the 
Dominican Republic undertake repara-
tions. The reparations include ordering 
the investigation be reopened, that the 
authorities determine the whereabouts of 
the victims’ bodies, that the state offer 
medical and psychological support, that 
the state accept public responsibility, that 
the state provide training on the rights of 
migrants and the use of force, and that the 
state pay reparations to the victims.
In the twelve-year span from 2000-
2012, the IACtHR granted ten provisional 
measures addressing the protection of 
Haitians or Dominicans of Haitian descent 
now in the Dominican Republic. The most 
recent decision of the IACtHR demon-
strates that both the Commission and 
Court continue to monitor the treatment 
of Haitian migrants inside the Dominican 
Republic.
Jessica Alatorre, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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